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Chapter 8
Risk-Sharing in Retiree Medical Benefits
George Wagoner, Anna Rappaport, Brian Fuller, and Frank Yeager
This chapter discusses the changing dynamics and risks of employer-pro-
vided retiree health benefits. In the USA, more of the risk of health care in
retirement is being shifting to retirees, often without their having access to
adequate and affordable health care solutions until becoming eligible for
Medicare (generally available at age 65). Employer coverage for health care
insurance is therefore very important to those retiring before Medicare
eligibility age.
In what follows, we first review US health care expenditures and discuss
the impact of demographic changes such as the aging of baby boomers.
Next we analyze government-provided retiree health benefits and some of
the potential challenges and risks related to this coverage. Against this
backdrop we assess the pressures on employer-provided health care bene-
fits,1 by tracking total health care costs for employees and retirees; this is
followed by a summary of employer responses. The discussion also exam-
ines the risks facing retirees and indicates what they can do to mitigate
those risks. Finally, we review the interactions between government risk,
employer risk, and retiree risk, as they relate to public policy. The discus-
sion concludes with an evaluation of the impact of public policy on
access to affordable retiree health care coverage, along with some
systemwide health care solutions. We conclude that in the USA, health
care costs will continue to rise and more risk will be shifted to retirees,
posing a major threat to the affordability of a good retirement for many
Americans.
The Setting
US health care expenditures have grown more rapidly than the economy
for many years. Figure 8-1 shows that the medical care component of the
consumer price index (CPI) increased 5.5 percent from 1990 to 2004,
compared to 3.1 percent for all CPI items (USBLS 2005). A national survey
of employer-sponsored health plans (Mercer 2004) found that employer
health care cost increases in the same period averaged 8.2 percent.2 These
costs can be particularly burdensome for companies who offer health care
benefits to both employees and retirees.
As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), health care spending
rose from 5.1 percent in 1960 to almost three times that level by 2000, and
the percentages are expected to continue increasing (CMS 2001). The
increasingly expensive nature of health care makes it more difficult for
companies located in the USA to compete globally. In 2002, Switzerland (at
11.2 percent of GDP) and Germany (at 10.9 percent) were the only indus-
trialized nations other than the USA (at 14.6 percent) where health care
costs accounted for more than 10 percent of the GDP (OECD 2004). The
public sector in the USA picked up 46 percent of this ever-increasing
component of GDP, with Medicare, a federal program mainly for those
age 65þ, picking up the majority of the costs. Medicaid, for low-income
people of all ages, is jointly funded by federal and state governments. Forty
percent is paid by the private sector, which includes employers, unions,
insurance companies, and others. Individuals pay the balance of the health
care bill, 14 percent, through premiums, deductibles, and other payments.
The percentage borne by individuals has been decreasing steadily for
over forty years, as shown in Figure 8-2. Many say that consumers are so
insulated from the cost of health care that they ‘overutilize’ health care
services (often to their detriment) or fail to consider all treatment options.
Increasingly, private- and public-sector experts support more consumerism
in the health care marketplace—through increased education and higher
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out-of-pocket costs—to encourage people to think more carefully about
what is needed and what treatment option would be most beneficial. These
costs can be particularly burdensome for companies who offer health care
benefits to both employees and retirees.
Part of the reason for this trend in the USA is population aging. People
born between 1946 and 1964, called Baby Boomers, were age 41–59 in
2005; this group made up 44 percent of the USA prime age population
(20–64) and 26 percent of the total population (US Census 2005). As
shown in Figure 8-3, substantially more people will attain age 65 and
become eligible for Medicare by 2010, a process that fuels the overall
upward trend in health care costs.
Health care costs increase with age and vary by gender, as shown in
Figure 8-4. Women tend to use more health care services at younger ages,
primarily because of maternity-related costs, while men have greater ex-
penses at older ages.
Government-Provided Retiree Health Care Benefits
The cost of employer-provided retiree health benefits in the USA is strongly
influenced by government programs. This is because the government pays
for well over half of all health care costs for people covered by Medicare,
and significantly more for people with both Medicare and Medicaid cover-
age. As the Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage takes effect, the
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government will take on an even larger portion of the costs. For retirees not
yet eligible for Medicare (pre-Medicare retirees), government programs
provide very little health care coverage with the exception of Medicaid
programs for lower-income people and Medicare for those disabled for
more than twenty-four months.
Because of the significant impact of Medicare on employer-provided
retiree health benefits, we will briefly review that program, including the
recently enacted Medicare reform law (known as the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003).3 In 1965 when
Medicare started, it had two parts known as Part A, providing hospital
insurance and Part B, providing supplementary medical insurance. This
nomenclature is still in effect: Part A covers inpatient hospital, skilled
nursing facility, hospice, and home health care; and as Part A is financed
by a payroll tax collected from employees and employers, enrollees do not
pay a Part A premium. Part B covers physician care, outpatient hospital
care, lab tests, medical supplies, and some home health care not covered in
Part A. Part B coverage is voluntary, and people opting for it must pay a
premium that covers one quarter of the cost of Part B (DHHS 2005). The
remainder of Part B is financed through general revenues. Neither Part A
nor Part B has traditionally covered outpatient prescription drugs, except
in a few narrowly defined circumstances (such as pain medications for
people qualifying for hospice benefits and certain cancer and immunosup-
pressive drugs).
Over the years, many Medicare enrollees have purchased supplemental
health care coverage from employers, unions, or private companies; Med-
igap coverage can be purchased from private companies in all fifty states.
Federal law requires a six-month initial enrollment period that begins
when a person is first eligible for Part B coverage. During this time, a
person cannot be denied Medigap coverage or charged a higher price
because of current or past health problems. Under the Medicare reform
law, beginning in 2006, these Medigap plans may continue to supplement
Parts A and B of Medicare, but they may not supplement Part D. Also,
Medigap carriers will be able to offer two new lower-priced products (called
Medigap plans K and L).
In 1982, Congress created what was then called Medicare Risk Plans;
subsequent legislation in the Balanced Budget Act then expanded the
concept and changed the name to ‘Medicare þ Choice’ or Medicare Part
C, and the 2005 Medicare reform law further expanded the concept. Today
these plans are called Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. These are offered
by insurance companies and others who receive a payment per member per
month in return for assuming the risk. Medicare Advantage plans must
agree to cover all services covered by original Medicare, and most cover
additional services as well; they are permitted to charge enrollees a pre-
mium if their costs are higher than what Medicare pays them. The most
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common type of MA plan is a health maintenance organization (HMO) in
which networks of doctors and hospitals, and their members, may use only
network or other approved providers except for medical emergencies. Two
other MA plans that use networks are point-of-service (POS) and preferred
provider organization (PPO) plans. The POS and PPO plans allow mem-
bers to use out-of-network providers, but members then pay more out-of-
pocket costs. From 2006, the Medicare reform law requires that these three
types of MA vendors must offer at least one plan that includes prescription
drug benefits at least as rich as those under Medicare Part D.
An additional MA option is the private fee-for-service (PFFS) plan. Pri-
vate insurance companies and vendors offer these plans, and they receive a
predetermined amount of money each month from Medicare to provide
benefits that are at least as rich as Parts A and B. These plans are not
required to have a provider network, and they are often offered in more
rural areas than the other MA plans. The PFFS plans can charge additional
premiums over what people pay under Medicare Part B, just like other MA
plans. The PFFS plans, however, are not required to offer prescription drug
benefits equivalent to those of Medicare Part D.
The concept behind the MA plan is that, by aggressively managing care,
private companies can control costs more effectively than the ‘non-man-
aged’ original Medicare, bringing about lower premiums for members,
benefit packages that cover more services than original Medicare, and/or
lower costs for the federal government. These advantages have been real-
ized in many instances. As Table 8-1 shows, 56 percent of people eligible for
Medicare lived in counties where they could purchase an MA plan at a ‘zero
premium’ in 2005, that is, at no additional payment above the Part B
Table 8-1 Retirees Eligible for Medicare Summarized by the
Lowest Premium for Available MA Plans
Lowest premium
available
Retirees eligible
for Medicare
Percent of
eligible
retirees (%)
Cumulative
(%)
$0 23,917,775 56 56
$0.01–$35.00 4,905,508 12 68
$35.01–$70.00 5,572,282 13 81
$70.01–$100.00 848,816 2 83
$100.01–$160.00 489,114 1 84
Subtotal 35,733,495 84 84
No MA plan 6,888,486 16 100
Grand total 42,621,981 100 100
Source: CMS (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) and authors’ calculations.
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payment (which all Medicare and MA enrollees must pay). In total, using
proprietary data we compute that 84 percent of people eligible for Medi-
care lived in counties where they could purchase an MA plan. Both health
care costs and Medicare reimbursement to MA plans can vary by county, so
the premiums and coverage also vary by county, sometimes significantly.
The Medicare reform law of 2005 brought about the most fundamental
change in the program since it was launched in 1965, mainly through the
addition of Medicare Part D, a benefit for outpatient prescription drugs.
The Part D benefit is delivered by prescription drug plans (PDPs) or as
Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans (MA-PDPs). While this new
drug benefit does offer some additional protection, many people will still
have significant out-of-pocket costs. With Part D coverage, people must pay
an initial $250 deductible, then 25 percent coinsurance for the next $2,000
in costs, then 100 percent of costs until they reach a $3,600 out-of-pocket
level. (These values are indexed in future years.) Amounts paid by employ-
ers or insurance companies do not count toward the retirees’ out-of-pocket
cost requirement. Part D pays roughly 95 percent of remaining costs after a
person’s expenses reach the out-of-pocket requirement. Enrollees are in-
tended to pay about one quarter of the cost of Part D coverage, which has
been estimated at under $500 per year in 2006, with the remainder paid
from general revenues.
Employer-Provided Retiree Health Care Benefits
In the USA, employers expend substantial amounts on employee and
retiree health care costs. As Figure 8-1 shows, employer health care cost
increases have tended to track increases in the medical component of the
CPS, but cost swings for employer coverage have been greater. During the
1990s, cost increases moderated because of the increased popularity of
managed care plans; cost increases then again accelerated in the late
1990s and early 2000s mainly due to some mis-estimation of the incremen-
tal impact of managed care on costs.
These patterns also drive employer-provided retiree medical care costs.
Indeed, retiree health care costs in 2004 rose 8 percent faster than in 2003
for pre-Medicare retirees, and 7.8 percent higher for Medicare enrollees;
Figure 8-5 shows that the pre-Medicare group’s cost per retiree was greater
than the cost per employee, while the Medicare group’s cost was less than
for employees. The cost differential between pre- and post-Medicare re-
tirees is partly reflective of rising costs with age; it can also vary depending
on retirees’ age and sex mix, the level of dependent coverage, and
whether disabled people, who have higher claims, are included with
the early retirees or employees.4 Lower costs for the Medicare group are
also attributable to the significant amount of retiree expenses paid by
Medicare.
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When considering costs for both employees and retirees, another im-
portant factor is ‘adverse selection’, sometimes called ‘intelligent employee
choice’. As employers increase the premium that employees or retirees
have to pay, some healthier people will tend to drop health care coverage.
Consequently, the average cost for the remaining covered group will tend
to go up faster than the underlying cost increase. In turn, even more
people might leave the program, putting still more pressure on the price.
As this adverse selection cycle continues, the program can quickly move
into a ‘death spiral’ unless an employer takes corrective action. This ad-
verse selection phenomenon is fueled by the fact that a very small number
of people can account for the majority of the cost. As shown in Figure 8-6,
the most expensive 5 percent of the claimants can account for over 50
percent of the total cost, while the healthiest 50 percent accounted for less
than 5 percent of the total cost.5,6
As the number of retirees with health care coverage began to rise after
World War II in the USA, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) became concerned that employers were not appropriately
recognizing that expense. (Unlike pension costs that were accrued over a
working person’s lifetime, retiree health care costs were not.) Accordingly
FASB (1990) issued its Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
Number 106 (FAS 106), requiring corporations to begin accounting
for retiree health care costs on an accrual cost instead of on a cash basis.
Expenses using the accrued liability, based on the present value of
Employees Pre-Medicare retirees Medicare-eligible retirees
2003 2004
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future retiree health care costs, proved to be substantially higher than
cash costs; indeed estimated FAS 106 liabilities often rivaled firms’
pension liabilities, but, unlike pension plans, typically had no offsetting
assets.
In response to the increased awareness of the cost of these plans, many
private-sector employers began tying decisions about future coverage more
closely to their overall business plan. Some continued offering retiree
coverage because they wanted to attract mid-career employees, wanted
employees to retire before age 65 to improve productivity, or had collective
bargaining pressure. Others, however, decided to reduce or eliminate the
coverage entirely. Figure 8-7 shows the consequent and steady decrease in
retiree health care coverage from over time.
In 2004, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) issued
new accounting standards for governmental retiree benefits other than
pensions. This statement (GASB 43) will require public-sector employers
to follow accounting guidelines similar to those of FAS 106, generally
beginning in 2007.7
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Controlling Retiree Health Care Costs. Employer efforts to control
retiree medical costs have been varied, including (a) tightening eligibility
requirements; (b) increasing deductibles, copays, and other retiree out-of-
pocket costs and thereby reducing amounts paid by the employer’s plan (in
keeping with the movement to consumerism in employee health care
plans); (c) increasing the percentage of premium paid by retirees; (d)
increasing the management of care; and (e) prefunding the employer’s
liability (through vehicles such as a 501(c)(9) trust [known as a VEBA],
401(h) sub-accounts in pension plans, and trust-owned health insurance).
Another tack has been to take a ‘defined contribution’ approach to health
care (DC Health), which defines the employer’s obligation as a fixed dollar
amount. In addition to ‘defining’ their contribution, employers must also
decide on the types of health insurance benefits that retirees will be able to
purchase.
The choice between self-funded or insured approaches determines how
precisely an employer has defined the cost of coverage and what level of
future involvement will be required. The impact of three approaches can
be summarized as follows:
. If an employer offers self-funded coverage, the firm first projects plan
costs and then sets the retiree premium to pay what is not covered by
46%
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Figure 8-7. Percentage of US employers offering medical coverage to retirees*.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Mercer (2004) for employers with 500 or more
employees.
*Represents employers planning to offer coverage to current employees and new
employees when they retire.
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the employer’s DC premium. When actual experience varies from
what was assumed when setting the retiree’s contribution, the employ-
er’s actual per capita contribution will vary from the ‘defined’ amount.
. If the employer sponsors an insured plan, the employer’s per capita
contribution is defined because the insured cost (the premium)
is guaranteed at least for a term. Insuring coverage does not relieve
employers of long-term involvement because they must renew cover-
age annually, with significant premium increase or terminated cover-
age a possibility. Also, there is often pressure for greater subsidy of the
employer plan.
. If an employer does not sponsor a plan, individual coverage must be
purchased in the marketplace. This approach, like the prior one, may
define the employer’s contribution; it also may get the employer out of
the retiree health care coverage business, eliminating even the re-
quirement to negotiate with carriers. The retiree bears the risk that
coverage may be inadequate, very expensive, or not available at all.
Employers adopting the DC health approach have a great deal of flexibility
in defining their commitment to retirees through the use of various ac-
count-based approaches. Accounts can be defined on a periodic basis (such
as monthly, annually) or an aggregate basis; they can provide amounts on
a retiree-only basis or include additional payments for dependants; and the
accounts can be funded or unfunded.8 For both the periodic and aggre-
gate amounts, the tax code contains opportunities for the contribution to
be tax deductible to the employer and not taxable to the retiree. For
example, the contribution amount could be provided through a Health
Reimbursement Arrangement (HRA) or under other plans satisfying Sec-
tions 105 or 106 of the Internal Revenue Code. If the DC approach were to
be used for pre-Medicare retirees, it would typically be in conjunction with
an employer’s self-funded medical plan because of the dearth of insured
products in the pre-Medicare market. For retirees eligible for Medicare,
however, the situation is quite different. As previously mentioned, MA
products are available to over 80 percent of those eligible for Medicare.
Medigap supplement plans are available to virtually 100 percent upon
initial eligibility for Medicare. It is quite feasible to arrange either an
employer-sponsored insured product or to let retirees purchase coverage
in the open market. With the addition of Part D prescription drug coverage
to Medicare, even those who do not buy coverage other than Medicare may
still be able to cover a large portion of their expenses.
As employers move to DC options, many will make a number of changes
in their underlying retiree health care benefit strategy. Employers often
offer more choices in plan design (such as a ‘high option plan’ that is very
similar to the employee plan as well as some more affordable options).
They may also provide opportunities for employees to save for future
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retiree health care expenses; or increase communication with employees
and retirees on general health issues, the need to save for future health
care expenses, and the business rationale for the change.
Challenges and Risks for Employers Offering Retiree Health Plans. As
noted, rising retiree health care costs present significant challenges for
employers. The level of increase has varied over the years, as shown in
Figure 8-8, but the trend has been relentless. Typically, employers require
retirees to pay a portion of the cost for health care coverage. The Mercer
2004 Survey showed that 38 percent of employers offering retiree health care
plans required enrollees to pay the entire premium as well as out-of-pocket
benefit costs: such plans offer coverage, but not necessarily affordable
coverage. Only 13 percent of employers provided coverage at no cost to
retirees. For the 49 percent that shared the cost with retirees, the average
retiree portion was 34 percent of the plan cost. The results for Medicare-
eligible plan coverage were similar: 37 percent require the retirees to bear
the full cost; 15 percent provide coverage at no cost to retirees; and 47
percent share the cost, requiring retirees to pay 35 percent of it.
Another major challenge facing employers is the growing ratio of re-
tirees to active workers, combined with the possibility that the federal
government might increase cost-shifting as the Medicare program ap-
proaches insolvency. Larger-than-anticipated Medicare premium increases
or benefit reductions could seriously challenge both employers and re-
tirees. An additional employer risk is adverse selection, particularly with DC
health approaches. For example, relatively healthier Medicare-eligible re-
tirees may drop employer coverage and purchase lower cost insured cover-
age (via an MA or a Medigap plan), or rely fully on Medicare as the gap
widens between the premium charged and the employer’s DC. Remaining
less-healthy retirees will have higher health care costs, forcing still higher
premiums. If only the sicker retirees remain covered in employer plans,
these plans may go into a death spiral where cost increases cannot be
appropriately reflected in the premium.
Retiree Options and Challenges
Retirees confront substantial risk regarding both health care expenditures
and employer-provided health insurance benefits. In the case where the
employer offers coverage, retirees below age 65 face higher premiums for
coverage in the open market; and in some areas, it is virtually impossible for
someone in poor health to purchase needed coverage. Even for retirees
enrolled in Medicare, premiums plus out-of-pocket costs can still be quite
high, even unaffordable for some. Furthermore, Medicare Parts B and D
premiums (set to cover one quarter of program costs) will clearly rise with
total Medicare spending, likely to grow faster social security benefits. Pri-
vate insurance premiums, premiums for employer coverage, and direct
payments to providers are also likely to increase in a similar manner. If
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employer contributions are capped or otherwise limited, retiree premium
increases will be even higher.
Other than through employer programs, retired workers not yet eligible
for Medicare can be rather limited: low-income people may qualify for
Medicaid or other governmental programs, and those eligible for social
security disability benefits for twenty-four months are eligible for Medicare.
But anyone who is healthy and meets insurance underwriting rules might
have to pay the full cost of coverage, which will seem quite high compared
to the subsidized cost paid before retirement. Retirees often pay more
because of premium caps or other limits on employer contributions, and
because employers may boost out-of-pocket benefit costs (deductibles,
copays, and out-of-pocket maximums) as they seek to control retiree cov-
erage costs and maintain consistency with the move to consumerism and
higher cost sharing for those still working and enrolled in employee plans.
The other problem is that early retirees often receive lower pension and
social security payments, compared to those retiring later. The dual
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problems of accessibility and affordability of coverage mean that employees
will have to save more money for retiree health care expenses, allocate
more financial resources to health care, work longer, rely on help from
family, or use a combination of these approaches. Unless people are
healthy, or government regulations support guaranteed access, many
people might find it advisable or necessary to work until they become
eligible for Medicare even if they have enough funds to pay for coverage.
For those retirees covered by Medicare, the picture is brighter. Accessi-
bility has not been a problem, as they can participate in Medicare Parts A, B,
and D, and Part C coverage is available to many. During the first six months
of eligibility for Medicare, anyone in original Medicare is guaranteed the
right to purchase a Medigap policy to supplement Parts A and B of Medicare
at ‘standard’ rates. Yet even with Medicare coverage, many older Americans
will face affordability problems: premiums for Medicare coverage are ex-
pensive, as are premiums for Medigap insurance and employer-sponsored
insurance, or private insurance. In addition, direct payment to providers of
service for deductibles, copays, and coinsurance are costly, as are other
expenses not covered by Medicare. And even with the new Part D coverage,
prescription drugs will remain a large expense for many people. In addition
to health care expenses, some retirees will also have significant long-term
care (LTC) expenses, primarily custodial in nature. For those who qualify,
Medicaid covers a significant percentage of LTC services. Because Medicare
provides only limited LTC coverage, people who are not eligible for Medic-
aid must rely on LTC insurance they purchase, on their own funds, or on
financial assistance from family members and others.
Possible Roles for Tax-Favored Saving Opportunities. Several challenges
face future retiree expenses and opportunities to save for retiree medical
costs. To these we turn next.
Potential Retiree Expenses. According to Fronstin and Salisbury (2003), a
person age 65 with employer-paid benefits might need between $37,000
and $750,000 to pay future claims that Medicare does not cover; a retiree
lacking employment-based benefits who purchases Medigap coverage
could need from $47,000 to $1,458,000. Using Mercer Survey data, we
modeled average future expenses using five sets of assumptions. First, we
assumed that cost trends over the most recent five years of the Mercer
Survey would be repeated in future years, and second we hypothesized that
the historical trends from the most recent decade years would be repeated.
Third, we averaged findings from the two previous sets. Last, we assumed
that health care cost trends would be consistent with FAS 106 assumptions
for large employer plans and that the trend would have shown 10 percent
increase per year. These variants were used to project costs to 2006 and
adjust the projection for the impact of Medicare reform on Medicare
enrollees. Next we projected these costs to 2031 using the five sets of
trend assumptions, shown in Table 8-2.9
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To obtain a better understanding of the funds needed at the time of
retirement for future health care expenses, we considered people who were
age 35 in 2006 and retiring in 20, 25, 30, or 35 years. Using these scenarios,
we calculated the present value of future costs at retirement for each age,
using the five alternative trend assumptions and a discount rate of 5
percent along with mortality, termination of coverage, and other assump-
tions from representative FAS 106 valuations. The present value of future
costs at retirement can be thought of as the amount of money needed in a
bank account at retirement so that expected future payments can be made
using principal and interest earned at an assumed rate, with the bank
account running out when the expected period ends. Table 8-3 shows the
present values at retirement for an age 35 worker in 2006, assuming he or
she retires in 25 years at age 60. Present values are shown where the retiree
pays out-of-pocket benefit costs (for copays, coinsurance, and deductibles)
plus a range of costs for premiums.
Even under these simple assumptions and using the same average start-
ing cost, we see a wide range of potential results: these start at a low of
$76,000 for a typical FAS 106 trend (if the employer pays 100 percent of
cost—probably unlikely in 2031) to a high of $2.26 million with a 10
percent trend and the retiree paying full cost. Note that the values vary
importantly with changes in trend, discount rate, mortality, and other
assumptions. While these hypothetical examples illustrate potential out-
comes, results for individuals can vary significantly. Values for retirement at
ages 55, 60, 65, and 70 are shown in Figure 8-9.
Tax-Favored/Saving Opportunities. Using these estimates of what future
retirees will need for health care costs, we next examine what options
they might have to start boosting their saving rates. In the US case, there
is an increasing number of tax-advantaged savings options to employees:
Table 8-4 outlines six of these. For example, a health savings account
(HSA), authorized under the Medicare reform law, provides outstanding
saving opportunities for employees who can meet the requirements and
have the financial resources and discipline to save. Both employees and
employers can contribute to an HSA before employee entitlement to
Medicare, as long as the employees participate in a qualifying high
deductible health plan (HDHP). These plans must have a minimum
deductible (of at least $1,000 in 2004 for an individual and $2,000 for
family, both values indexed thereafter), and they must meet other
requirements (the least attractive of which is the prohibition on having
almost any other health coverage during the periods that HSA
contributions are made by or for an individual). The maximum
contribution, from employee and employer, is the lesser of the deductible
in the HDHP and $2,600 ($5,150 for a family, both values indexed from
2004). The range of possible contributions for an individual in 2004 was
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$900,000
Maximum possible contribution, no outflow
Funds used for employee health care
Full contribution for minimum deductible plan, no outflow
HSA accumulation ($000s) under various savings scenarios
2006 Age = 35, (1995−2004 Average trend)
Assumed rate of return = 5.00%
Figure 8-9. HSA accumulations assuming 5 percent return investment compared to
expenses assuming repeat of historical Mercer Survey experience from 1995 to
2004.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Mercer (2004). Range of cost will vary depending
on retiree’s health, employer plan, etc.
Costs and accumulations at retirement age for people 35 years of age in 2006,
assuming average trend from 1995–2004 Mercer Surveys, and 5 percent HSA
investment return
Retirement
PVFC-R1 for out-of-pocket benefit
cost plus percentage of premium for
employer plan HSA funds, No out-flow
HSA with
out-flow4
Age Year 0 Percent
contribution
33 percent
contribution
100 percent
contribution
Maximum
contribution2
Minimum
contribution3
55 2026 $86,602 $248,548 $577,347 $122,337 $47,989 $14,856
60 2031 $98,119 $281,601 $654,126 $191,741 $80,500 $14,828
65 2036 $108,101 $310,249 $720,672 $277,325 $120,373 $6,319
70 2041 $143,186 $363,693 $811,389 $353,945 $153,630 $0
Notes:
1Present value of future costs at retirement, based on a 5 percent discount rate. Trends for
1995–2004 are 5.2 percent pre-Medicare and 6.9 percent for people eligible for Medicare.
2Maximum contribution allowed ($2,600 in 2004, indexed); no outflow.
3Maximum contribution allowed with minimum deductible ($1,000 in 2004, indexed); no
outflow.
4Maximum contribution of $1,000 with minimum deductible of $1,000 in 2004, indexed;
experience of four times average out-of-pocket benefit costs once every four years.
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$1,000–$2,600 (indexed thereafter), depending on the level of the
deductible. The contributions are before taxes, investment earnings are
not taxable, and withdrawals from the account for health care—either while
an employee or a retiree—are not taxable. The funds in an HSA are
portable, nonforfeitable, and can be carried over into retirement.
As an example of what an individual employee could save, we assess the
HSA in three situations: (a) saving the maximum each year ($2,600 in 2004,
indexed thereafter) and spending no HSA funds for current health care
costs (Scenario A); (b) saving the largest amount possible while in a plan
with the lowest deductible level allowed ($1,000 in 2004, indexed) and
spending nothing on current health care costs (Scenario B); and (c) saving
the largest amount allowable while in the plan with the lowest deductible
Table 8-4 Comparison of Tax-Advantaged Savings Vehicles
Savings
vehicle Contribution
Investment
earnings
Disbursements
for health care
Limitations on
contributions
HSA Pretax Tax-free Not taxable Maximum contribution,
HDHP2
401(k) Pretax Tax-deferred Taxable Employer must offer
plan; pretax and
total contribution
limits; minimum
required distributions
after specified age
Traditional
IRA
Pretax Tax-deferred Taxable Maximum contribution;
tax-deduction limit
for active retirement
plan participant based
on income; minimum
required distributions
after specified age
Roth IRA Posttax Tax-free Not taxable1 Contribution limits
based on income
VEBA Posttax Tax-free Not taxable Employer must offer
plan
Roth 401(k) Posttax Tax-free Not taxable1 Not available until
2006; can designate
portion of 401(k)
contributions as
after-tax; contribution
limits unclear;
additional regulations
expected
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes:
1Distributions are not taxable after age 59½ and 5 years of participation.
2High deductible health plan; minimum deductible of $1,000 in 2004; indexed; maximum
contribution of $2,600 in 2004 (indexed).
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but using the HSA for current health care costs (Scenario C). The first two
situations are unlikely and not possible unless the employee had virtually
no health care expenses while still employed, or had enough income and
discipline to pay those health care costs from non-HSA sources. We find
that accumulations after 25 years (in 2031 for someone starting to save in
2006) are approximately $192,000 under Scenario A, $80,000 under Scen-
ario B, and $15,000 under Scenario C.
Comparison of Expenses to Savings. Figure 8-9 also shows the annual
accumulation for all three scenarios and compares them to the present
value of future health care costs at retirement for four ages at retirement: 55,
60, 65, and 70 (the amount that should be ‘in the bank’ at retirement so that
projected future retiree costs could be paid from principal and interest).
For each age at retirement, we show the range of out-of-pocket costs
(copays, coinsurance, and deductibles plus premiums for Parts B and D),
and premium payments for the employer-sponsored retiree coverage from
0 to 100 percent, based on cost increase trends that duplicate experience in
the Mercer Survey data from 1995 to 2004 (average annual trends of 5.2
percent for pre-Medicare and 6.9 percent for Medicare-eligible retirees).
Even retirees who have enough financial resources and discipline to save
in an HSA and not use the funds before retirement would need to use other
savings, work longer, or work for an employer who provides a very generous
retiree health care plan if they want to retire before becoming eligible for
Medicare. Many may face the same challenges even when eligible for Medi-
care. Given the substantial fluctuation in health care costs over the last ten
years, any estimate should be viewed only as a hypothetical projection of
what future experience could be. Funds actually needed for retiree health
care coverage will vary depending on retiree health status, employer cover-
age, and other factors that will be different for each individual. Even if
actual investment earnings are higher and retiree costs are lower than the
range projected in Figure 8-9, older adults may still have to devote signifi-
cant portions of their income to health care in retirement. Many baby
boomers’ situations may not prepare them for retirement as well as they
have hoped. The financial challenges and burdens of health care costs will
be particularly painful for lower-income adults who do not have employer
coverage and who do not qualify for Medicaid.
Outstanding Policy Issues
The US health care system faces serious challenges. Solutions to the prob-
lems, or lack thereof, will be a major force behind changes in retiree health
care coverage. While a full outline of all the challenges and solutions is
beyond the scope of this chapter, we briefly discuss these and then focus on
issues specific to retiree health care coverage.
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US health care delivery and financing is the result of a hybrid system of
employer coverage, government-sponsored programs, individual insur-
ance, and individual payments, with many people uninsured. Solutions to
cover all US citizens have been discussed and rejected in the past, although
Medicare is essentially universal coverage for the age 65 and older popula-
tion. Going forward, some believe incremental changes will be sufficient to
meet the challenges; reforms to adapt current programs have been sug-
gested to help early retirees, including reducing Medicare’s eligibility age,
allowing some early retirees to purchase Medicare, and mandating
COBRA10 coverage for early retirees.11 Others believe that reform of the
individual insurance market will provide solutions. A major obstacle is the
current practice of underwriting individual risk to determine whether to
offer coverage and how much to charge for the coverage. This underwrit-
ing, which adds to the challenge of covering sicker people, reduces the
insurance companies’ problem of adverse selection. Fundamental change
would be needed in the individual insurance market before providers can
offer a solution to the unhealthy uninsured.
Some policy experts believe small, incremental changes will be insuffi-
cient to effect systemic reform, favoring instead comprehensive, system-
wide solutions such as employer mandates supplemented with individual
mandates as necessary; expansion of current public programs; creation of
new programs that target subsets of the uninsured; and establishment of a
universal, publicly financed program (Simmons 2005). The debate con-
tinues as to how—and whether—employers provide health care coverage
to retirees. If health care reform relies on incremental changes, employer
programs are not likely to change much. If employer mandates occur,
there will be a significantly greater role for employers in providing retiree
health care coverage. But a single-payer national program could mean no
direct employer role in providing health care to retirees.
Retiree Health Care Policy Issues. Retirees, employers, and the
government—the three sources of funds to finance health care cost in
retirement—face challenges and should have a seat at the retiree health
care policy table. In evaluating their challenges and roles, we first consider
issues of accessibility and affordability of coverage for retirees’ eligible for
Medicare and those not eligible for Medicare; then we turn to challenges
for Medicare; and finish with an assessment of the impact of federal policy
on employer-provided health care coverage.
Access and Affordability of Retiree Health Care Coverage. Historically, retirees
have faced the dual challenges of access to coverage and affordability of
coverage. The addition of Part D prescription drug coverage makes access
less of a concern for retirees able to access Medicare, though affordability
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will still be a problem. Projections by Johnson and Penner (2004) indicate
that health care spending for older married couples will rise increasing
from 16 percent of net after-tax income in 2000 to 35 percent in 2030; they
further estimate that unmarried older adults will face an increase from 17
to 30 percent. The problems will be most severe for lower-income people,
and for unhealthy individuals.
Retirees ineligible for Medicare will face even more obstacles. Some with
low income or employer-provided coverage, and those disabled under
social security for twenty-four months, will have access to benefits. Others
may obtain coverage if they are healthy enough to pass underwriting or
because they qualify through HIPAA,12 COBRA, high-risk pools, or in-
surers of last resort. Yet a significant number is still unable to purchase
adequate coverage, while others choose not to purchase coverage. The
National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI 2001) found that 15 percent
of people age 55–64 were uninsured in 1999.13 As to affordability of
coverage, people ineligible for Medicare face even greater challenges
than those eligible: coverage is more expensive for them because there is
no government benefit to pay some of the costs, and they have additional
years when they need coverage. They also have fewer years as an employee
to save for future health care expenses.
The Future of Medicare. Medicare faces serious long-term financing
challenges because the population eligible for Medicare is growing
more rapidly than the number of active workers, and health care costs
are increasing at a higher rate than the economy as a whole. A related risk
is the reaction of employers to similar problems; as economic pressures
cause employers to cut back on retiree health care coverage, there will be
growing pressure to increase Medicare benefits. Direct cost pressure will
also come to Part D of Medicare if employers end the coverage for which
they get a tax-free subsidy. Medicare’s cost per retiree for those in Part D
will be greater on average than its cost for the employer subsidy, and
therefore Medicare’s total cost will increase when retirees move from the
employers’ plans to Part D (US CBO 2004). Regarding long-term
financing challenges, the American Academy of Actuaries has defined
four major areas for addressing future Medicare policy: these include
long-term access to care, maintaining access to care while avoiding
unnecessary utilization, meeting the insurance needs of Americans age
55–64, and private-sector competition strategies (American Academy of
Actuaries 2005).
Clearly much uncertainty surrounds Medicare in the future. Some want
Medicare to remain a government-run program, while advocates of com-
petition want to see much more participation by the private sector, with
vendors assuming risk such as allowed under the MA and prescription
drug provisions of the Medicare reform law.14 There is also uncertainty
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about how private providers will respond to increased market opportun-
ities. Experience with prior legislation may offer some guidance. The
1997 Balanced Budget Act encouraged a substantial shift of risk to pri-
vate-sector Medicare þ Choice plans, predecessors of MA plans. After
some initial success, these plans faltered and declined; many employers
strongly promoted Medicare þ Choice plans in the 1990s, but they then
became skeptical as plans closed and physicians dropped out. Insurers
and other potential sponsors of MA plans may still be skeptical of their
future. While there has been recent growth in the number of plans and
enrollees, it remains to be seen how many plans will be available in future
years and whether they will be stable. Similar issues may affect market
participation in the new Medicare Part D. Uncertainty about Medicare is
a backdrop for uncertainty about the future distribution of risk-sharing
of retiree health care costs among the government, employers, and
retirees.
Federal Policy and the Role of the Employer. In the USA, there has long been a
strong connection between receiving health care benefits and one’s
employment, yet some health policy experts are now challenging that
nexus. That is, there is a sense in which employers might not be the best
option for providing health benefits for employees or retirees. The tax
system has also been an important force encouraging and supporting the
current system. Employers can deduct expenses for health benefits, and
employees and retirees do not pay taxes on their value. From a federal
budget point of view, employee benefits constitute a large tax expenditure.
Of course, though employer programs do decrease tax revenue, they still
benefit a large number of people. One of the strengths of employer-
provided coverage is that it automatically spreads risk and enables
coverage of sicker as well as healthier people. This is not true for
individual coverage or retiree-pay-all employer plans where selection
becomes a huge issue.
Employer health care plans in the USA are voluntary; nevertheless, they
are still subject to extensive regulation such as employee benefits law,
requirements that employer health plans must be offered for a limited
period after termination of employment, and requirements that individual
insurance plans must accept people who had previously been covered by
employer plans.15 While employer sponsorship of both pensions and re-
tiree health benefits is voluntary, regulations are more specific and exten-
sive for DB pension plans than health benefits. Pension law generally
requires vesting, includes minimum coverage rules, and outlines benefit
accrual requirements. There are no similar requirements for retiree health
plans. Pensions are subject to mandatory funding, but retiree health bene-
fits are generally not prefunded. (Even if an employer wants to prefund
voluntarily, it is difficult to do so on a tax-favored basis.) The application of
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age discrimination law creates uncertainly for both types of benefits. Legal
requirements and uncertainty about them interact with cost and financial
risk to discourage employers from offering both retiree health and con-
ventional pension benefits.
Conclusions
The dynamics and risks of employer-provided retiree health care benefits
are changing. The combination of health care costs increasing at a faster
rate than the overall economy and the increasing ratio of retirees to
employees is challenging both government and employer programs. Em-
ployers continue to reduce benefits or terminate retiree health benefits
plans entirely. The projected insolvency of the Medicare Part A Trust Fund
by 2020 could force Congress to raise premiums and/or cut benefits.
Of all those who pay for health care, retirees face the greatest uncertainty
and potential risk. Finding affordable coverage is a major challenge today,
one likely to become more difficult in the future. Even when coverage is
available, it is often expensive. Tax-favored savings vehicles, such as HSAs,
can help some people save for retiree health care expenses. However, many
will not be able to save enough to pay for future health care coverage
without diverting other funds to health care coverage needs and/or work-
ing longer.
Retiree needs for affordable health coverage and adequate retirement
income will greatly affect retirement security in the future, and their
problems will likely grow more severe. It seems likely that solutions must
be part of a broader national approach to health care reform. Nevertheless,
agreement on a specific approach does not appear likely in the near term.
Endnotes
1. In this chapter we do not cover long-term care benefits which are custodial in
nature.
2. The Mercer Survey has been conducted annually since 1993, and it is based on a
statistically valid random sample of all US employers with ten or more employ-
ees; it is projectable to the US labor force. (For private firms in the survey, a
random sample is drawn from the Dun & Bradstreet database. All state govern-
ments are included; a random sample of county and local governments comes
from the Census of Governments.) The survey includes only employers who
sponsor insurance. For each plan type that they sponsor, respondents provide
information about the plan with the largest enrollment. In 2004, the total
number of participants was 3,020.
3. Further information on benefits and program details are available in DHSS
(2005).
4. The Mercer Survey data on cost per person include costs for covered dependents.
5. Authors’ calculations based on unpublished Mercer proprietary data.
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6. Figure 8-6 shows that in any year, 15 percent of the population can account for
roughly 75 percent of health care spending. In this group are chronically ill
people who account for substantial costs year after year. In most areas, individ-
ual insurance regulations allow private health insurers to underwrite and insure
only the better risks. In such markets, people in poorer health are either unable
to purchase coverage, or if they can, they do so at a very high price. Healthier
people, on the other hand, are sometimes reluctant to share in the cost of care
for the sicker population in a system of voluntary purchase. The combination of
the risk distribution and use of underwriting has been a barrier to the develop-
ment of a working private individual insurance market that serves the entire
population well. An alternative to permitting underwriting is risk adjustment or
mandatory risk-sharing so that payments to health care plans are redistributed
on the basis of anticipated health care utilization and status of the covered
population. Risk adjustment is used by Medicare and in some states for indi-
vidual coverage, but experience is currently limited.
7. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) has issued similar
accounting standards (GASB Statement 45) for governmental employers that
offer retiree health and other nonpension postemployment benefits (OPEB).
The GASB 45 establishes accrual accounting and financial reporting require-
ments for OPEB, including a requirement to disclose unfunded OPEB obliga-
tions, that could lead to lower debt ratings for some governmental employers.
The GASB 45 was phased in for large employers beginning December 2006; one
year later for medium-sized employers; and two years later for small employers.
A related standard (GASB 43) on financial reporting funded by OPEB plans
takes effect one year earlier.
8. As an example of a monthly account, the plan could give each retiree $600 per
month before Medicare eligibility and $200 per month after Medicare coverage
begins. This amount could vary by years of service or be the same regardless of
service. The amount could increase annually at a specific index (such as the CPI
or a flat percentage); it could remain at the initial level; or it could be increased
on an ad hoc basis. The amount not used could be carried over to future years, or
the funds not used could be forfeited. An example of an aggregate or ‘lump sum’
approach is the commitment of an aggregate amount such as $20,000 (based,
e.g. on $1,000 per year for 20 years of service or a flat $20,000 for all retirees) to be
used over the life of the retiree to pay for health care premiums and/or
expenses. A retiree would not receive funds from this account until health care
expenses are actually incurred or premiums are paid. Prefunding would not be
required, although the employer could prefund through some of the methods
mentioned previously. Accounts could be credited with interest or not; the funds
could be used on a draw-down basis as expenses are incurred, or the aggregate
amount could be converted to a monthly payment amount similar to an annuity.
9. More detail on the calculation methods is available from the authors.
10. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) was passed in
1986, requiring employers with 20þ employees to allow those leaving service to
continue medical coverage (if offered) by paying 102 percent of the cost for
employee coverage (150 percent for those disabled).
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11. The American Academy of Actuaries recently examined future policy issues for
Medicare and they outlined some conditions needed to make buy-ins and
focused on adequate participation and getting a reasonable spread of lives
including healthy lives (American Academy of Actuaries 2005).
12. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) law passed in
1996 increases availability of health insurance to people with preexisting con-
ditions if they have maintained continuous health care coverage.
13. In 1999, 66 percent of people aged 55–64 had employer-sponsored health
coverage; 11 percent had public program coverage; 8 percent had individually
purchased coverage; and 15 percent were uninsured; 77 percent of those
employed and 48 percent of those not employed had employer coverage. Of
those in the labor force, 13 percent were uninsured while 18 percent of those
not in the labor force were uninsured. Three percent of those in the labor force
and 24 percent of those not in the labor force were covered by public programs.
Seven percent of those in the labor force and 10 percent of those not in the
labor force had individually purchased coverage (NASI 2001).
14. The Medicare reform law shifts the majority of risk for MA plans and prescrip-
tion drug plans to private-sector programs. The new law also encourages em-
ployers to share in the risk of offering prescription drug coverage in return for a
tax-free subsidy. However, the details of risk shifting sometimes do not make it
attractive to the private sector.
15. State regulations also shape benefit mandates, though self-insured employee
benefit plans are exempt from state law under the federal Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act.
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